6.1 Deploy NIDS with Your Eyes Open
While this book discusses strategies to make the installation,
configuration, tuning, and administration of Snort as efficient and
effective as possible, it is important to understand that running an
NIDS is not as simple as plugging it in and watching. People often
underestimate the labor involved with the ongoing maintenance of an
NIDS (any NIDS, not just Snort). While you can minimize their
occurrence, false positive alerts keep you busy confirming that they
are, indeed, false. New signatures come out that detect the latest
batch of Internet worms and they need to be reviewed, tuned,
integrated, and distributed.
One of the challenges of using an open source
application like Snort is that there are new versions fairly
regularly. These new versions may have additional functionality that
you want to use. The only problem is that sometimes this
functionality causes older ways of doing things to change or be
replaced (the portscan2 and conversation preprocessors being replaced
by flow-portscan, for example). Test new versions and functions
before upgrading. Sometimes new functions can introduce new bugs,
too. Fortunately, open source testing of beta versions along with the
cooperation and development done by Sourcefire (the company that
sells the commercial version of Snort) eliminate most bugs before
they make it into production code.
None of the previous discussion even touches on the challenges
involved when you really find evidence that you are under attack or
that you've been hacked. An effective security
manual that includes a thorough incident response plane will pay
dividends (of course, developing the plan takes time, too). The
difficulty of getting those Balkanized departments to work together
will certainly figure in to the fun, too.
All of these things can conspire to make you a very busy
administrator. Is having a good awareness of what is going on in your
network and on your servers worth the effort? In my experience,
absolutely. Sticking your head in the sand and being ignorant of the
harm being done to your organization is no way to run a network.
We talked in the introduction about the concept of defense-in-depth,
where each device on your network plays a role in its own security
and multiple strategies are employed to make catching (and stopping)
attacks possible. An NIDS deployment will not be the big box of
security that some people think they need to "have
security" in their organization (almost every
organization has a person with an MBM degree—Management By
Magazine). There is no such thing as a single device that will secure
your network.
NIDS is another layer of defense. It compliments your efforts in
other areas, catching things that your other efforts miss. You still
need to apply security patches to your software and systems. You
still need to segregate Internet-facing systems to an isolated
network (usually referred to as a DMZ). You still need to audit your
system logs. An NIDS provides early warning that someone is probing
you or that an attack is being attempted against your
systems—you catch them when they are looking in the window or
jiggling the doorknob instead of catching them after they are inside
the house (or not noticing them at all).
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