1.2 Defense-in-Depth
When deploying troops in a theater of war, a general has to consider
all the ways an enemy may attack: by land (either at the front line,
or a commando raid behind the lines), by sea (surface ships or
submarines), or by air (helicopters, fighters, bombers, missiles, or
artillery). The general has to deploy defenses against all potential
vectors of attack. He doesn't just trust the
trenches at the front line for all his security. He will deploy
troops to the front line, as well as at high-value assets behind the
lines. He will deploy a variety of anti-submarine and anti-surface
ship defenses. He will deploy a variety of anti-air assets to protect
against the various air threats. This concept of multiple overlapping
defensive measures is known as
defense-in-depth.
A similar system can be applied to network security. Instead of
trusting the eroding value of perimeter defenses
(firewalls) for all of our security, we turn
to other mechanisms. We configure systems according to
industry-accepted best practices (disable unnecessary services, keep
software updated, run antivirus software). We establish a system to
securely aggregate our system logs in one place (and we monitor those
logs for anomalies). We segregate our network to control access to
important machines and to
"wall-off" partner and remote
connections. We utilize strong authentication and authorization
practices. And finally, we take steps to detect and prevent
intrusions (preferably attempted intrusions) on our network and on
our systems. We also try to do this with limited budgets and limited
time. In the real world, the general is trying to protect against
lost real estate. In the network world, the administrator is
protecting against downtime and data loss. I won't
beat the analogy to death. The main thing to remember is not to trust
a single component of your security framework for all your security.
If you are able to, apply security as close to the thing you are
trying to secure as possible. These steps will help you stop at least
80% of attacks. Intrusion detection should catch the remaining 20%.
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